University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 31
Number 2 Spring 2001

Article 5

2001

Recent Developments: State v. Sampson: Search of
Garbage Placed for Collection in a Public and
Readily Accessible Area Does Not Violate the
Fourth Amendment
Michelle M. Owens

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Owens, Michelle M. (2001) "Recent Developments: State v. Sampson: Search of Garbage Placed for Collection in a Public and
Readily Accessible Area Does Not Violate the Fourth Amendment," University of Baltimore Law Forum: Vol. 31 : No. 2 , Article 5.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol31/iss2/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please
contact snolan@ubalt.edu.

Recent Developments

State v. Sampson:
Search of Garbage Placed for Collection in a Public and Readily Accessible Area
Does Not Violate the Fourth Amendment
By Michelle M.Owens

n a four to three decision,
theCourt of Appeals of
Maryland defined the scope of the
Fourth Amendment when a resident
places her garbage within the
curtilage of her property and the
police subsequently take the trash
directly from the property. State v.
Sampson, 362, Md. 438, 765 A.2d
629 (200 1). Furthermore, the court
held that an individual relinquishes
any reasonable expectation of
privacy in the trash once it has been
placed in, or even near, a public way
for collection. !d. at 452, 765 A.2d
at 636.
Respondent, Donna L.
Sampson ("Sampson"), became the
target of an investigation involving
controlled dangerous substances.
Upon a tip received by a business
merchant, members of the
Cambridge City Police Department
began looking for evidence by
searching through Sampson's trash.
Sampson's home has a shallow front
yard that leads to a municipal
sidewalk, while the curb and public
street are on the far sidewalk. The
garbage bags were routinely left in
front of a tree located two to three
feet from the sidewalk. Upon
learning that Sampson's trash was
regularly collected from her home on
Monday and Thursday mornings,
the police performed "trash runs" on
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six successive trash collection days.
Just before the trash collector was
due to arrive, the investigating
officer, while standing on the
sidewalk, reached over the two to
three feet of lawn, picked up the
trash without stepping on the lawn,
and took the trash to the police
station, where the trash bags were
opened and searched. The garbage
bags were opaque and made of
green or white plastic. The police
obtained clear plastic baggies, with
the comers cut out, that contained
traces of cocaine from the garbage
bags.
Sampson was convicted in the
Circuit Court for Dorchester County
of possession of cocaine and
maintaining a common nuisance.
The Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland reversed Sampson's
convictions holding that the seizure
of the trash bags, and their contents,
violated Sampson's Fourth
Amendment rights. The Court of
Appeals of Maryland granted
certiorari to determine if it is
permissible for the police, either
directly or through prior
arrangements with trash collectors,
to seize and search garbage that has
been set out for collection.
The court began its analysis by
reviewing case law in which the
United States Supreme Court
established guiding principles

regarding the issue, beginning with
Calif. v. Greenwood, 486 U.S.
35, 108 S. Ct. 1625 (1988). !d.
at 441, 765 A.2d at 630. In
Greenwood, the Court held that
when the police, through a prior
arrangement with the trash
collector, obtain, open, and search
through trash containers set out on
the curb outside the curtilage of a
home, they do not violate the
FourthAmendment. !d. at441-42,
765 A.2d at 630 (citing Calif.v.
Greenwood, 468 U.S. 35, 108 S.
Ct. 1625 (1988)). In the instant
case, the court of appeals opined
that the curtilage concept was
designed to afford the immediate
area surrounding a house the same
protections as the house itself.
Sampson, at 442, 765 A.2d at 631
(citing United States v. Dunn, 480
U.S. 294, 107 S. Ct. 1134 (1987)).
Accordingly, the Court ofAppeals
ofMaryland assumed, for purposes
ofthis case, that the trash bags were
left within the curtilage of
Sampson's home. /d.
The court further analyzed the
Fourth Amendment under the
pivotal case of Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S. Ct.
507 (1967). /d. at 442-43, 765
A.2d at 631. In Katz, the Court
held that the Fourth Amendment
does not protect places, but instead
protects people. /d. (citing Katz
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v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
351-52, 88 S. Ct. 507, 511).
Therefore, what one knowing-ly
exposes to the public does not
become subject to the protections
afforded by the Fourth Amendment.
/d. As a consequence, the court of
appeals concluded that although
Sampson may have entertained a
subjective expectation of privacy in
her trash, such an expectation was
not objectively reasonable.
The court distinguished
between Greenwood and the
situation present in Sampson,
where the resident places the trash
within the curtilage ofher home and
the police take the trash directly
from the property, rather than from
the trash collector. /d. The court
of appeals, however, found no
significant difference in the two
situations. /d. The court found
support in the guiding principal that
generally, when one places trash in,
or even near, a public way for
collection purposes, the person
loses any reasonable expectation of
privacy in such material. Sampson,
at 446-47, 765 A.2d at 633-34.
Subsequently, the court gave great
weight to the rule:
Absent proof that a person has
made some special arrangement for
the disposition of his garbage
inviolate, he has no reasonable
expectation of privacy with respect
to it once he has placed it for
collection. The act of placing it for
collection is an act of abandonment
and what happens to it thereafter is
not within the protection of the fourth
amendment. Id. at 447, 765 A.2d
at 634 (quoting United States v.

Cromwell, 586 F.2d 1020, 1025
(4 1h Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 959,99 S. Ct. 1500 (1979)).
Consequently, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland found that
Sampson's trash was in an area at
or near a public way, and thus
exposed and readily accessible to
the public, and that she relinquished
any reasonable expectation of
privacy in the seized trash.
Sampson, at 451-52, 756 A.2d at
636. Therefore, whether the trash
at issue is technically found within
the curtilage of one's home is no
longer the proper focus; instead the
standard the court will apply
involves inquiry into whether the
person placed her trash for
collection in an area so that it was
readily accessible to the public. /d.
Sampson demonstrates the
on-going debate surrounding the
issue of whether it is permissible for
the police, either directly or through
prior arrangements with trash
collectors, to seize and search trash
set out by persons for collection.
Much of the debate focuses on
whether the trash is within the
boundary of the curtilage concept
and who takes the trash, a police
officer or the routine trash collector.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland
limited such an inquiry. The location
of the trash is not an important
focus, but the pivotal inquiry is
whether the trash is readily
accessible to the public. Although
the court is certainly not expunging
the curtilage concept, it is defining
the scope within which the concept
functions in interpreting Fourth
Amendment inquiries. Whether

one places his trash within or
outside that area intimately tied
to the home itself is not important,
because the person discarding the
trash has no expectation of
privacy
in
the
trash.
Conclusively, the court defines
Fourth Amendment protections
based on a reasonable expectation
of privacy and such expectation
must be objectively reasonable to
society.
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